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15 July 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bross

SUBJECT : NIRB Roles Suggested by the Froehlke Report

1. The general effect of the Froehlke Report seems to me to tend to expand the roles of the NIRB rather than to preempt them. The key role of NIRB here is to represent the analytical and production components of the community in establishing intelligence objectives and making judgments as to the value of information relating to them. Through the DCI, NIRB would be the authoritative source of the reasons for resource allocations and their relative levels, both in the present and as projected for guidance to the Five Year Intelligence Plan. All this implies a number of new techniques which will have to be developed as we go along. As you know, we have no consistent basis for judging the value of information or what a proper level of effort would be to get that information, and this would seem to be the core of NIRB's service to the new world Mr. Froehlke is making.

2. Additionally, the NIRB would ensure a degree of consistency and continuity in procedures and criteria which could offset the "ad hoc" quality of DOD studies and resource decisions which Mr. Froehkle alludes to on page 4 and which he hopes his staff and the CDIP will cure. It is essential that the NIRB evolve a set of evaluation criteria which it can apply uniformly to each of the problems it takes up. Only through this kind of uniform

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procedure can the charge of bias and unfairness be set aside.

3. Another new role for NIRB is implied on page 4 where Mr. Froehlke mentions the risks involved in accepting reduced or alternate levels of effort. Here again we have no accepted standards to measure risks or even a reasonable idea of how to go about setting such standards. As in the paragraph above, NIRB needs to take the lead in development of the tools needed in resource management by both NIRB and the new DOD staff.

4. It seems inevitable that there will need to be the closest collaboration between the NIRB staff and the staff of the Special Assistant/Intelligence (SAI) to ensure that State and CIA needs are taken into consideration by DOD and that DOD problems and possible resource decisions are known at the earliest stages of their development. This is implied in Objective 2 (page 4) but needs to be worked out in practice. I assume that as D/DCI/NIPE you will have the main responsibility for continuing contact with the SAI himself.

5. There should be a certain amount of labor sharing between NIRB staff and the SAI staff in working up major issue studies referred to on page 5. I would like to think that NIRB would take the lead in identifying the issues to be studied, but I recognize that resource problems and options within DOD are likely to be more influential in driving the system. Nevertheless, NIRB's as they are produced are likely to identify a number of issues -- such as the

question -- which could go to the SAI staff for follow-up

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and eventual decision in the Defense Intelligence Board. In such cases the work already done by NIRB staff would be a useful input.

6. It seems clear from the Froehlke Report from the size of the staff he contemplates that the TOD is going to grow in importance to both the NIRB and the SAI staff. Certainly, an agreed numbers base like the TOD will vastly assist collaboration between the two staffs and will in turn be assisted by a uniform data system in DOD implied in the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Plan. Only through a TOD system can real comparabilities among diverse programs and projects be achieved and this would seem to lie at the heart of what Mr. Froehlke is after in his Objective 1.


7. It appears essential for NIRB to take the responsibility for implementing some part of Project Prover, referred to by Mr. Froehlke on page 8. Prover, as you know, is a proposed system for ascertaining the needs and opinions of the users of finished intelligence products. It would seem to be an essential part of the NIRB function of providing the regions for resource allocations and is best performed for the whole community rather than for just DOD intelligence producers. Moreover, the information garnered by the Prover type of inquiry is an essential part of any NIRB as the final evaluation and guide as to what the intelligence community should be about.

8. Another role for the NIRB and its staff implied in the Froehlke Report is that of support to the DCI in his role on the Executive Council.

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his homework shop, in effect. This may lead the NIRB staff to a number of short-term papers and away from the more general NIRMs, but it will bring the staff into contact with big resource issues which will affect NIRMs already done and those to come. A direct support to the DCI or Executive Council, however, must start at the lower levels in the program review cycle and long before the Executive Council meets on a particular issue. To this end, the DCI's NIPE (presumably the NIPE/NIRB staff) should participate in the DOD review work at the Defense Intelligence Board level and in the issue study groups; also, the DCI's NIPE office should receive the initial PCRs since many eventual issues will have their inception in these proposals.

9. All in all, the Froehlke Report adds urgency to the need to organize a NIRB staff, get space, determine how to go about producing NIRMs, establish our credentials for tasking those we need help from and prepare ourselves to live in double harness with a 14-man SAI staff. They're likely to be pretty active partners and we may have to move fast to keep up with them.



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